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ABSTRACT 
Christian List has recently defended what he refers to as a compatibilist-libertarian theory of free 
will. He attempts to satisfy the libertarian requirement for alternative possibilities without 
assuming the falsity of physical determinism. To do so, List relies on a multi-level modal theory 
that he developed with Marcus Pivato. In this theory, List and Pivato demonstrate the 
compatibility of physical determinism and agential indeterminism. The success of compatibilist-
libertarianism essentially hinges upon whether or not List and Pivato’s theory is truly consistent 
with a non-hypothetical conception of possibility. In this paper, I argue that, despite his attempt 
to distance himself from a standard compatibilist (i.e. hypothetical) conception of possibility, 
List remains committed to such a hypothetical conception. I also argue that List’s theory of 
agential causation is implausible given his modal interpretation of agency. Therefore, I conclude 
that compatibilist-libertarianism is an implausible theory of free will. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 Christian List (2014) has recently defended what he refers to as a “compatibilist-
libertarian” theory of free will. His theory is compatibilist insofar as it demonstrates that free will 
is compatible with physical determinism, while it is libertarian insofar as it requires agential 
indeterminism. He suggests that it may be described as both “cross-level compatibilist” and 
“agential-level libertarian” (unpublished-1, 18). In other words, he thinks that free will is 
compatible with the truth of determinism at the physical level, while it is not compatible with 
determinism at the level at which free agency must be described, i.e., the agential level. Notice 
that this theory assumes that agential indeterminism is compatible with physical determinism. 
Such cross-level compatibility assumes that the truth of determinism is relative to a specific 
level, such that determinism may be true at one level while false at another.1 
 The conceptual support for such a level-specific conception of determinism is what I will 
refer to as the multi-level modal theory, as developed by List and Pivato (2014). According to 
their theory, agential indeterminism is compatible with physical determinism if we assume (as 
they do) that “higher-level states [such as agential states] are typically multiply realizable by 
lower-level states” (2014, 20). In their jargon, the basic idea is that a multiply-realized, higher-
level history may have multiple possible (higher-level) futures, despite the fact that each of the 
history’s multiple lower-level realizers only has a single possible (lower-level) future. So, 
because there are multiple lower-level histories that can realize a single higher-level history, 
there may be multiple possible higher-level futures, even though each lower-level history only 
has a single possible future. Therefore, List and Pivato conclude that higher-level indeterminism 
 
1 Traditionally, determinism is considered to be a property of entire worlds, such that either determinism is 
true of the entire world, or it is not. The idea that determinism and indeterminism can both be true at different levels 
of the same world is a view that is, as far as I know, unique to List. 
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(more than one possible future) is compatible with lower-level determinism (only one possible 
future) if the higher level is multiply realizable at the lower level. The key assumption is that all 
of the modal propositions that are relevant to free agency are level-specific. 
 By demonstrating the compatibility of physical determinism and agential indeterminism, 
List attempts to develop a compatibilist theory of free will that satisfies the libertarian 
requirement for alternative possibilities, or the possibility of doing (or the ability to do) 
otherwise – hence, compatibilist-libertarianism. In order to distance his view from those of 
standard compatibilists, List argues that standard compatibilist conceptions of possibility are 
either conditional or dispositional, and what unites both of these conceptions of possibility is that 
they are hypothetical. According to these views, agents only have alternative possibilities 
available to them insofar as things could have been different, assuming some aspect of the past 
had been different. Because these conceptions of possibility are all hypothetical, libertarians are 
not satisfied. Libertarians want a conception of alternative possibilities in which more than one 
future is available to an agent given an identical history in a world with identical laws. Given the 
compatibility of agential indeterminism and physical determinism, however, List claims to have 
solved this problem for the compatibilist. In other words, he claims to have provided the 
compatibilist with alternative possibilities that even a libertarian would (or, at least, should) 
accept. One goal of this paper, however, is to argue that List has failed to provide a non-
hypothetical conception of possibility. 
 In defense of compatibilist-libertarianism, List poses an objection to the consequence 
argument. Initially proposed by Peter van Inwagen (1986), the modal version of the consequence 
argument concludes with a modal proposition about agents (roughly, no agent ever has the 
possibility of doing otherwise and hence no agent has free will) that is supposedly entailed by the 
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truth of determinism. For the argument to be valid, there are two rules of inference proposed by 
van Inwagen that must also be valid. The first of which, Rule Alpha, says that we can infer an 
agential-level modal proposition (e.g., ‘~P is agentially impossible’) from another modal 
proposition (e.g., ‘P is necessary’), where the latter modal proposition is entailed by the truth of 
determinism. But, according to List, although physical determinism may turn out to be true, we 
have good reason to believe that agential determinism is false. Therefore, List argues that any 
sound version of the consequence argument must begin by assuming the truth of physical 
determinism. But, if we assume physical determinism, then the only way for the argument to 
derive an agential-level modal proposition from physical determinism is to assume Rule Alpha 
allows for cross-level modal inferences. But if Rule Alpha allows for cross-level modal 
inferences, then it must be invalid.2 According to List, agential-level modal propositions (such 
as, ~P is agentially impossible) cannot be derived from any physical-level modal proposition 
(such as, P is physically necessary). Consequently, List concludes that the consequence 
argument is invalid insofar as an agential-level modal proposition (namely, the conclusion that 
an agent does not have the possibility of doing otherwise) cannot be derived from a physical-
level modal proposition (i.e., any of the modal propositions entailed by the truth of physical 
determinism). In short, his objection to the consequence argument relies on his rejection of cross-
level modal reasoning – according to List, cross-level modal propositions are not well-formed 
and cross-level modal inferences are invalid. 
 In an attempt to revise both the consequence argument and List’s multi-level modal 
theory, I propose a way of conceptualizing cross-level modal reasoning that I argue is both 
 
2 Others have argued that Rule Alpha and van Inwagen’s second rule – Rule Beta – are both invalid for 
different reasons. I will not discuss any of those arguments in this paper. 
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consistent with common instances of such reasoning in science and provides a framework for 
understanding the significance of List and Pivato’s argument for emergent indeterminism. 
Specifically, I introduce what I refer to as a meta-level. For now, it will suffice to say that what I 
have in mind is another application of the levels metaphor in which two or more ‘levels’ are 
considered at once.3 With meta-levels and some rules for deriving meta-level modal propositions 
from level-specific modal propositions worked into List’s modal theory, I propose a revised 
version of the consequence argument designed to avoid the objection posed by List’s response. 
What I aim to demonstrate in the revision is that List must be committed to the hypothetical 
conception of possibility that he hopes to avoid. In light of this, I argue that compatibilist-
libertarianism provides nothing more a new-fangled version of compatibilism that is stuck with 
the hypothetical conception of alternative possibilities, which libertarians should find no more 
satisfying than previous versions. 
 To further develop my critique of List, I also argue that compatibilist-libertarianism 
actually fares worse than standard compatibilism. To demonstrate, I describe two caricatures of 
popular arguments in the free will literature – the first of which is directed against the 
compatibilist, the second is directed against the libertarian. I refer to the first argument as the 
causal source objection. In short, this objection states that, if determinism is true, then agents 
cannot be considered the causal source of their actions. What seems to be the most common, and 
I think the most plausible, response to this objection consists in demonstrating that agents may be 
the most plausible difference-makers of the direct consequences of their actions. List and 
Menzies (2017), for example, have developed such a strategy in response to the causal exclusion 
argument. So far, List’s view seems just as well off as any compatibilist view that invokes a 
 
3 For a discussion of the multiple uses of the “levels metaphor,” see Craver (2015). 
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difference-making account of causation. But after considering the randomness objection – the 
second of the two objections I will discuss – I argue that the compatibilist-libertarian is actually 
in a worse position than the compatibilist insofar as the difference-making account of agential 
causation appears to be inconsistent with agential indeterminism. Assuming agential 
indeterminism, what seems to best explain the difference between two worlds with identical 
agential histories and divergent agential futures is each world’s distinct physical history (since 
each agential future has the same history, while each distinct physical future has a distinct 
history). Thus, a difference-making account of agential causation seems to undermine the 
plausibility of agential causation within the theoretical framework articulated by List. 
 I conclude the paper by arguing that List’s has three recourses against my argument: (1) 
he could argue that cross-level modal reasoning is intrinsically fallacious (a view I argue against 
in this paper), (2) he could accept my construction of meta-levels but insist that free will must be 
described solely at the agential level (and at any meta-level that merely includes the agential 
level as a base-level), or (3) he could insist that causation is level-specific (a view I will not 
argue against in this paper). Insofar as the latter view has been defended, List’s view may remain 
plausible without needing to address my objection. In any case, I hope this paper will, at the very 
least, call his view into question and place on his shoulders the burden of answering a few more 
questions about the coherency of his view. As it stands, I’m not convinced that List’s theory truly 
satisfies any libertarian requirement, and I’m concerned that his theory is less coherent than other 
versions of compatibilism. At best, I think he has only provided standard compatibilists with a 
logical framework for thinking about alternative possibilities hypothetically, but without 
satisfying any sort of libertarian requirement for alternative possibilities. At worst, his view is 
incoherent. 
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2 COMPATIBILIST-LIBERTARIANISM 
In this section, I introduce the multi-level modal theory to which List is committed. In short, 
it’s a way of thinking about modality in a leveled world. A leveled world is simply a world that 
can be divided into distinct levels – what this means will, I hope, be made clearer in this section. 
List’s multi-level modal theory provides a way for thinking about the modal properties of a 
world that is divisible into distinct levels. To be precise, the theory is a logical framework for 
deriving modal propositions about multi-level dynamical systems. I emphasize that List has a 
level-specific conception of modality, according to which the truth of determinism and other 
modal propositions are level-specific. For example, List argues that, even if physical-level 
determinism is true, agential-level determinism may be false. The logical consistency of physical 
determinism and agential indeterminism is what makes List’s compatibilist-libertarian theory of 
free will logically possible. There are three goals in this section: (1) to explain the basic structure 
of List’s multi-level modal theory; (2) to explain the logical possibility of physical determinism 
and the emergence of indeterminism at higher levels; and (3) to describe List’s theory of free will 
and his commitment to a non-hypothetical conception of possibility. 
2.1 Modality in a leveled world 
I begin by explaining List’s (unpublished-2) unified framework for a system of levels.4 
Consider the two levels that he considers for the purposes of defending his theory of free will – 
 
4 His framework is unified insofar as it can account for four distinct conceptions of a level: levels of 
granularity, ontological levels, levels of description, and levels of dynamics. Assuming List’s unified framework is 
sound, all of the claims made in this paper should apply to each conception of levels. With that said, however, I will 
only discuss levels of description and dynamics insofar as these conceptions are the most amenable for the purposes 
of evaluating the consequence argument. 
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the physical level and the agential level.5 Each of these levels (qua levels of description) contains 
a specific language capable of describing any possible world at that level (and only that level). 
So the language of physics is capable of describing all of the physical facts of any possible world 
that has physical facts, while the agential language is capable of describing all of the agential 
facts of any possible world that has agential facts. A complete specification of a possible world 
at a specific level will include a complete specification of that world’s facts at that level and in 
the language of that level. Consequently, the number of possible worlds is relative to the 
granularity of the level of analysis. For example, a lower level such as the physical level is finer-
grained than higher levels; therefore, the level of physics will carve logical space into more 
possible worlds than a higher one such as the agential level. 
 List and Pivato refer to each complete specification of a possible world at a specific level 
as a history h. For example, there is a single physical history p that specifies all of the physical 
facts about our world (even if those facts have yet to be settled at this point in time). Put simply, 
histories are level-specific possible worlds. An incomplete specification of a possible world at a 
specific level from the beginning of that world until some arbitrary time t is referred to as a 
truncated history ht. For example, there is a single truncated physical history pt that specifies all 
of the physical facts about our world from the beginning of our world until t.  
 With the notion of histories (which are simply level-specific possible worlds), the modal 
facts of a possible world can be specified. According to List and Pivato, the truth of a modal 
proposition about some future state S is determined by the number of histories [{h1, h2 … hn} 
where S ∈  h1 and S ∈  h2 and … S ∈  hn] that are nomologically consistent (according to the laws 
 
5 I should note that, throughout this paper, I will only discuss the physical and agential levels. My 
arguments, however, should be considered sufficiently general to apply to any pair of levels in which one of the 
levels supervenes (or is higher-than) the other. 
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of the level at which S is described) with the truncated history ht of the specific world in 
question. For example, the physical state P is possible in world w at t if and only if there is at 
least one history p such that P ∈  p and p is nomologically consistent with the physical laws of w 
and the truncated physical history pt of w. Conversely, P is necessary if there is only one 
nomologically consistent history and P is impossible if there are no nomologically consistent 
histories. For the purposes of this paper, specific states (which are subsets of histories) will be 
notated with capital letters (such as P – a physical state, or A – an agential state), while complete 
histories of the world will be notated with lower-case letters (such as p – a physical history, or a 
– an agential history). This is consistent with the notation employed by List. 
 The level-specificity of this modal framework must be emphasized. To say that P is 
possible in some world is to say that P is possible relative to the laws of physics and the 
truncated physical history of that world. So to say that P is possible is to say that P is physically 
possible. But to say that some agential state A is possible is to say that A is agentially possible. 
Since the agential level is distinct from the physical, List uses the following level-specific modal 
operators for distinguishing physical and agential modal propositions: 
 Physical necessity and possibility: □ P and ◊ P 
 Agential necessity and possibility: ■ A and ♦ A 
Since these modal operators are relative to level-specific histories and laws, the domain of each 
modal operator only includes states that are described at a specific level. Thus, physical states 
cannot be agentially possible or necessary, and agential states cannot be physically possible or 
necessary. Such cross-level modal propositions are not well-formed according to List and 
Pivato’s multi-level modal theory. 
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 It is important to emphasize the difference between the conception of modality defined 
within the multi-level modal theory and the logical conception of modality.6 According to List 
and Pivato (unpublished), their theory is describing a nomological conception of modality in 
which a future state is assigned modal properties relative to its consistency with the past and the 
natural laws. A state may be nomologically impossible given certain conditions in the actual 
world even though it is logically possible. For example, it may be nomologically impossible for 
me to perform a better bicycle kick than Cristiano Ronaldo, even though it is certainly logically 
possible for me to do so. With this in mind, it is easy to see the difference between physical and 
agential modal properties. While it may be physically possible for the collection of physical stuff 
that constitutes my body to be moved from one location to another, it may be agentially 
impossible if moving to that other location involves placing myself into an undesirable agential 
state (such as boredom, fear, or anxiety) given the history of my life as an agent and the laws that 
determine my behavior. Put simply, if we are thinking about what is nomologically possible, we 
may reach different conclusions depending upon which set of laws we are considering. For the 
purposes of this paper, it will be assumed that all references to possibility and necessity are 
nomological unless otherwise noted. 
2.2 Supervenience, multiple realization, and emergent indeterminism 
 Nevertheless, there are some cross-level modal properties in a leveled world. In fact, List 
argues that, for any collection of levels to truly constitute a system of levels, there must be some 
set of supervenience mappings between those levels. In agreement with Kim that a system of 
 
6 Hegel makes a similar distinction between formal (or logical) and real (or relative) possibility. Something 
is formally possible insofar as it is non-contradictory, while something is really possible given the totality of 
conditions that would necessitate the thing’s actualization. 
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levels need not be linearly ordered, List argues that a system of levels can be partially ordered 
according to “higher-than” and “lower-than” relations between levels (unpublished-2, 5). To say 
that the agential level is higher than the physical level is to say that the agential level supervenes 
on the physical. According to List, this entails that there is a surjective mapping of physical 
states onto agential states such that every physical state maps onto a specific agential state. 7 A 
surjective mapping from one set to another simply means that every member of the first set 
corresponds to a single member of the second set, even though some members of the second set 
correspond to multiple members of the first set. In short, a surjective mapping from the physical 
level to the agential implies that the physical facts determine the agential facts. This means that 
each physical state necessitates a specific agential state, even though multiple physical states 
may be possible for any given agential state.8 According to List, higher levels, such as the 
agential level, are most likely multiply realizable at lower levels, such as the physical level. So 
although each physical state must correspond to a single agential state, there may be some 
agential states that correspond to multiple physical states. In other words, some agential states 
may stand in a one-to-many relation to physical states.9 
 
7 A surjective mapping between lower and higher levels simply means that every lower-level state 
corresponds to a single higher-level state, even if some higher-level states correspond to multiple lower-level states. 
Technically, List may be wrong to think that this mapping is surjective because there are seemingly physical states 
that do not correspond to any agential state. 
8 To clarify, I do intend to say that every physical state necessitates a specific agential state. One might 
argue that certain physical states do not necessitate any agential state. For example, puddles of mud do not seem to 
realize any agential state; therefore, it would be strange to insist that puddles of mud necessitate any sort of agential 
state. But I would argue that puddles of mud do necessitate the absence of any agential state. I describe necessity 
relations this way because it captures the idea that supervenience entails the complete necessitation of all 
supervenient facts by subvenient facts.   
9 It may be worth noting that most philosophers would not endorse their conception of multiple realization. 
For example, one of List’s examples of multiple realization is that “many different states of the individual water 
molecules in a flask can instantiate the same aggregate state of the water” (2017, 9). But this disjunction of lower-
level molecular arrangements of H2O do not have any relevant differences in the way in which they realize the 
higher-level functional property of being water, or being drinkable, or boiling at 100 degrees Celsius, etc. So for 
philosophers such as Shapiro and Polger (2016), who argue that differences in color or material do not necessarily 
constitute relevant functional differences in the way in which two distinct bottle-openers perform the function of 
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 Since the agential level is likely multiply realizable, List and Pivato argue that the truth or 
falsity of agential determinism is independent from the truth or falsity of physical determinism. 
In their jargon, determinism is true if and only if every truncated history is nomologically 
consistent with only one possible history; while indeterminism is true if some truncated histories 
are consistent with more than one possible history. So if we assume physical determinism, then 
we are assuming that every truncated physical history is nomologically consistent (according to 
the laws of physics) with only one possible physical history. But assuming the agential level is 
multiply realized, there may be multiple agential histories that are nomologically consistent with 
any truncated agential history that supervenes on a physically deterministic history. 
 
opening bottles, List’s conception of multiple realization is too liberal. In any case, I will simply assume List’s 
conception of multiple realization for the rest of this paper, which shouldn’t be too controversial since many of those 
who think that multiple realization is false may still believe that something like List’s conception of multiple 
realization is true, even if they would not refer to it as ‘multiple realization.’ So readers familiar with the multiple 
realization literature may want to keep in mind that, henceforth, ‘multiple realization’ will refer to List’s conception. 
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Figure 1.  Emergent Indeterminism 
 
 To demonstrate, I have borrowed the above diagram from List and Pivato. Figure 1a 
illustrates a deterministic lower level. Each line represents a specific history that can be divided 
into truncated histories and futures. Notice that there are no branching histories – for every 
truncated history, there is only one possible future. In figure 1b, however, there are many 
branching histories. Most notably, the truncated history h8 is multiply realized by five distinct 
truncated histories at the lower level. And since h8 is multiply realized by these five distinct and 
deterministic lower-level histories, it may have up to five distinct possible futures.10 
 
10 Emergent indeterminism is quite similar to Donald Davidon’s (1980) anomalous monism. While List and 
Pivato insist that emergent indeterminism is consistent with the physicalism – the thesis that everything is 
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 It is important to notice that supervenience mappings establish modal relations that must 
hold between the two levels. List even claims that supervenience mappings can be understood as 
“necessitation mappings” (2017, 4). Since the agential level supervenes on the physical level, all 
of the agential facts in a world are necessitated by the physical facts of that world. But notice that 
this makes it seem as if, despite the appearance of agential indeterminism, any world that is 
fundamentally physical (i.e. all levels supervene on the physical) and physically deterministic 
must be actually deterministic at the agential level. If all of the physical facts about the future are 
necessary and all of those facts necessitate a specific agential future, then there isn’t really more 
than one possible agential future (because if there were more than one possible agential future, 
then there should be facts about that future that are not-necessary). From this perspective, it 
would seem as if agential indeterminism is merely epistemic – the agential level only appears to 
be indeterministic if we leave out information about the level on which it supervenes. 
 It is probably not surprising, however, that List and Pivato (2014) acknowledge this 
objection and have a response. They argue that, although the motivation for distinguishing 
between two levels may be epistemic, the modal properties nomologically defined within each 
level are objective. As List puts it, we may initially be motivated to develop a distinct level of 
description to describe agents because explaining human behavior solely in the language of 
physics would be epistemically impossible. But even if our motivations for describing a new 
level are epistemic, the modal properties defined within each level need not be epistemic – they 
may be objective features of the world described at the new level. In other words, their 
 
fundamentally physical. Thus, List and Pivato are committed to physical monism. Furthermore, the justification List 
and Pivato provide for assuming agential indeterminism is certain anomalies that agential theories seem incapable of 
explaining. Similarly, the justification for agential indeterminism is quite similar to what Jerry Fodor (1974) has 
referred to as the ceteris paribus laws of the special sciences.   
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suggestion seems to be that levels are externally epistemic, while internally objective. In a 
nutshell, this response simply reiterates their level-specific conception of modality. As I will 
explain in more detail in the third section, List argues against the possibility of constructing 
cross-level modal propositions and making cross-level modal inferences. For now, it will suffice 
to say that List argues that cross-level modal propositions are not well-formed and that cross-
level derivations are fallacious. 
2.3 A non-hypothetical conception of possibility 
List first proposed his compatibilist-libertarian theory of free will in his paper, “Free will, 
determinism, and the possibility of doing otherwise” (2014). Citing the compatibility of physical 
determinism and agential indeterminism, he demonstrates that the libertarian requirement that 
free agents have the possibility of doing otherwise is compatible with physical determinism. 
Moreover, he insists that only a modal (or, as I argue, non-hypthetical) interpretation of the 
‘possibility of doing otherwise’ is sufficient to satisfy this requirement – in other words, only a 
modal conception of possibility is consistent with libertarianism. 
 Contra other compatibilists, he argues that both the conditional and dispositional accounts 
of the possibility of doing otherwise fail to conceptualize possibilities as actually being available 
to agents. In other words, what both the conditional and dispositional accounts have in common 
is that they only make sense of the possibility of doing otherwise hypothetically. Consider the 
conditional account. On this account, an agent is said to have the possibility of doing otherwise 
insofar as they would have acted otherwise if they had chosen otherwise. While on the 
dispositional account, an agent is said to have the possibility of doing otherwise insofar as they 
would have acted otherwise if some unexercised yet present disposition had been exercised. 
What both of these accounts have in common is that an agent is said to have the possibility of 
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doing otherwise if they would have acted differently in some sort of different context. According 
to a modal account, however, an agent is said to have the possibility of doing otherwise if and 
only if that possibility is consistent with the actual history of that world. In other words, a modal 
account requires future states to be possible without hypothetically altering any of the historical 
context in order to truly be considered ‘possibilities.’ 
 Not surprisingly, List cites the compatibility of physical determinism and agential 
indeterminism in order to demonstrate that a modal conception of alternative possibilities is 
consistent with physical determinism. First, if we assume agential indeterminism, then it is 
logically possible that an agential history could have been otherwise at time t without altering 
any aspect of that agential history prior to t. According to List, this satisfies a libertarian 
conception of the possibility of doing otherwise insofar as it does not rely on a hypothetical 
account of such possibilities. And since agential indeterminism is logically consistent with 
physical determinism, this should also satisfy the compatibilist. Therefore, he refers to his theory 
of free will as ‘compatibilist-libertarianism.’ 
 But, as Nadine Elzein and Thomas Pernu (2017) have argued, List’s theory of free will 
“fails to break us from [the] deadlock within the free will debate” between compatibilists and 
incompatibilists. To be clear, the target of their critique is supervenient libertarian theories in 
general. But since List’s compatibilist-libertarianism seems to provide the most formal 
representation, or perhaps the most prototypical, of these sorts of theories, they focus their 
argument almost exclusively on his theory of free will. Supervenient libertarianism is essentially 
the attempt to reconcile the libertarian requirement for alternative possibilities with physical 
determinism by employing the distinction between distinct levels – such as the physical and 
agential. So for my purposes, supervenient libertarianism can be considered identical to 
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compatibilist-libertarianism. According to Elzein and Pernu, what truly distinguishes 
compatibilist and libertarian accounts of “the ability to do otherwise” is that compatibilists are 
“non-actualists” and are satisfied with “conditional and dispositional analyses,” while 
libertarians are “actualists” and are committed to a “non-conditional analysis” (222). They argue 
that List’s theory of free will can be described as an actualist-compatibilist theory of free will. 
  However, Elzein and Pernu are skeptical about whether or not List succeeds in 
articulating a compatibilist theory of free will that is truly consistent with actualism. The non-
necessary possibilities of agential indeterminism seem to be undermined by the necessity of 
physical determinism and the supervenience relations between the physical and agential levels. 
Recall that multiple realization is a one way street. Although there are multiple physical states 
that correspond to a single agential state, each physical state necessitates a specific agential state. 
And of course physical determinism necessitates each physical possibility – in other words, each 
physical state is only possible if it is also necessary; or, if (and only if) a physical state is 
possible, then it is necessary. So unless List wants to abandon supervenience, it seems to follow 
that the non-necessary agential possibilities are only epistemically non-necessary. In fact, 
however, only a subset of the agentially non-necessary possibilities are possible given the actual 
history of the world. To be precise, only those agential states that are necessitated by their 
necessary physical realizers are possible. And because they’re necessitated by necessary states, 
they must be necessary themselves. 
 List, of course, justifies the consistency of agential indeterminism and physical 
determinism by appealing to the level-specificity of modality. Elzein and Pernu discuss two 
“basic lines of justification” for such a level-specific conception of modality. First, List appeals 
to the impossibility of predicting agential phenomena with only physical laws. And second, he 
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appeals to the impossibility of translating agential language into physical language. I do not 
challenge List on the plausibility of either of these claims. However, I argue that neither of these 
claims is sufficient to restrict his multi-level modal theory to such a level-specific conception of 
modality insofar as both of these impossibilities are merely epistemic. As I see it, merely 
epistemic reasons for differentiating between the two levels is not sufficient to exclude modal 
reasoning that cuts across those levels. In defense of the first claim, he argues that it is 
“completely infeasible” to predict human behavior solely at the physical and neuroscientific 
levels (2014, 168). And in defense of the second claim, he argues that it may be 
“computationally impossible” to ever know the complete set of physical states upon which any 
given agential state is multiply realized. But it is both completely infeasible and computationally 
impossible to provide an objective measure over which futures are nomologically consistent with 
the entire physical history of the world. Nevertheless, List thinks that this idealized way of 
thinking provides us with a useful framework for thinking about the modal structure of the 
world. Likewise, even though cross-level modal reasoning may be epistemically or 
computationally impossible, there is no reason to think that we can’t have an idealized 
framework for thinking about the cross-level modal structure of the world. 
 Elzein and Pernu seem satisfied concluding that List’s theory of free will may be much 
closer to the standard compatibilist accounts from which he is attempting to distance himself. 
Although they remain skeptical, they are open to the plausibility of List’s level-specific 
conception of modality and the coherence of his view as both an actualist and compatibilist 
theory of free will. In contrast, however, I attempt to pose a much more damaging critique in 
List’s argument. Although they remain open to the plausibility of the level-specificity of the 
multi-level modal theory articulated by List and Pivato, I am not convinced. As I will argue in 
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the next two sections, List’s theory must assume a hypothetical (or, non-actual) conception of 
possibility. If this argument is sound, then List’s theory of free will should be considered 
compatibilist, plain and simple – it is neither actualist nor libertarian. In the next section, I 
describe List’s response to the consequence argument which explicitly relies on two objections 
that he makes against cross-level modal reasoning. In both of these objections, List cites formal 
reasons against the possibility of allowing for a cross-level conception of modality in his multi-
level theory. In the following section, I attempt to formalize a new concept – namely, meta-levels 
– into the theory that avoids both of List’s objections and allows us to make cross-level modal 
inferences. 
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3 THE INVALIDITY OF CROSS-LEVEL MODAL REASONING 
In this section, I explain the consequence argument and List’s response, which cites the 
invalidity of cross-level modal reasoning. But more importantly for the purposes of this paper, I 
argue that List’s response to the consequence argument commits him to the sort of hypothetical 
analysis of alternative possibilities that he claims compatibilist-libertarianism avoids. As I 
explain in this section, List’s best counter-response is his argument for the invalidity of both 
cross-level modal propositions and inferences. It is important to recognize, however, that these 
propositions and inferences are only invalid according to the assumptions of List’s multi-level 
theory. In the next section, I argue that we can formally introduce ‘meta-levels’ into his theory 
and develop a sophisticated account of cross-level modal reasoning. But before doing so, the 
reasons against cross-level modal reasoning should be made clear. 
3.1 The consequence argument 
The original consequence argument proposed by van Inwagen (1986) presupposes two 
rules: Rule Alpha and Rule Beta. I will only be concerned with Rule Alpha insofar as List’s 
objection to the consequence argument is that Rule Alpha is invalid. According to van Inwagen’s 
formulation, Rule Alpha states: 
 Original Rule Alpha: □ P →NP 
where NP states that “P is true, and there is nothing anyone could have done to make it false.” 
According to List, we can replace N with the modal operator ~♦~. So we can revise Rule Alpha 
in the modal jargon of List and Pivato: 
 Rule Alpha: □ P → ~♦~P 
When we say that there is “nothing anyone could have done make P false,” we are saying that ~P 
is impossible at the agential level. Therefore, NP is equivalent to ~♦~P. So, at least according to 
20 
 
List, the Original Rule Alpha and Rule Alpha as they are depicted above are equivalent – I have 
no qualms with this view. 
 Given the revision of Rule Alpha in the language of the multi-level modal theory, List 
reconstructs the consequence argument as follows11: 
 Rule Alpha: □ P ⟝ ~♦~P     
 Rule Beta: ~♦~(P → Q), ~♦~P ⟝  ~♦~Q 
1. □ ((po & L) → P)       Determinism 
2. □ (p0 → (L → P))       Exportation 
3. ~♦~(p0 → (L → P))       Rule alpha 
4. ~♦~p0         Assumption 
5. ~♦~(L → P)        Rule beta 
6. ~♦~L        Assumption 
7. ~♦~P        Rule beta 
The basic idea is that, if physical determinism is true, then any physical state that is 
nomologically possible (relative to the laws of physics and the physical past of the actual world) 
is also necessitated by the past and the laws of physics. And since there is nothing anyone can do 
to change the past, the laws of physics, or the fact that each possible future state is a necessary 
consequence of the past and the laws of physics, then there is nothing anyone can do (or could 
have done) to change the fact that some future state must occur. 
 Before explaining List’s response to the consequence argument, it is important to note 
what most compatibilists consider to be the best type of response. Perhaps most notably, David 
 
11 To be clear, if the two iterations of Rule Alpha described above are equivalent (which I assume is the 
case), List’s reconstruction of the consequence argument should be equivalent to van Inwagen’s initial formulation 
of the argument. 
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Lewis (1981) points out that, if the laws had been slightly different, then a different agential state 
would have been possible. Notice that this relies on the sort of conditional (or, hypothetical) 
analysis of possibility described in the previous section. In fact, Kadri Vihvelin (2013) refers to 
Lewis’ response (and similar responses) as conditional. What these sorts of views have in 
common is their hypothetical structure – if the laws had been slightly different, or if the past had 
been completely different, then some other agential state would have been possible. Both of 
these sorts of responses rely on hypothetically altering the actual past or the actual laws in order 
to derive alternative possibilities. Although Vihvelin’s own account of the possibility of doing 
otherwise is dispositional rather than conditional, it too is hypothetical. The basic idea is that an 
agent could have acted otherwise if they had acted on a disposition that was unexercised in the 
actual circumstances. This is consistent with the agent having the disposition in question in the 
actual circumstances, as long as the disposition was unexercised. So although an agent’s 
dispositional constitution need not be hypothetically altered to make sense of the possibility of 
doing otherwise, whether or not the disposition was exercised must be. Thus, even the 
dispositional account of the possibility of doing otherwise is hypothetical. 
 As I explained in the previous section, List insists that the theoretical virtue of 
compatibilist-libertarianism is that it need not rely on such a hypothetical analysis of the 
possibility of doing otherwise. Given his level-specific conception of modality, compatibilist-
libertarianism provides agents with robust modal possibilities, i.e. non-necessary possibilities 
that may be considered possible without hypothetically assuming that the entire past or some of 
the laws had been different. Therefore, a conditional response to the consequence argument is 
not available to List without undermining the libertarian side of his theory of free will. Although 
he doesn’t say so explicitly, he does seem to suggest that these sorts of objections to the 
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argument are inconsistent with compatibilist-libertarianism. Without an argument to the contrary, 
I will assume that a hypothetical response to the consequence argument is inconsistent with the 
compatibilist-libertarian theory of free will that List has in mind. 
3.2 The compatibilist-libertarian response to the consequence argument 
List argues that the primary problem with van Inwagen’s consequence argument is the 
invalidity of Rule Alpha. What is invalid about the rule is its cross-level modal structure. 
According to List, we cannot infer modal propositions at one level from modal propositions at 
another level. And in van Inwagen’s depiction of the argument, Rule Alpha must be used to 
derive an agential modal proposition from a physical modal proposition. There are two ways in 
which we can understand this inference, both of which are invalid. First, we might interpret P as 
a physical state. If so, then the expression ‘~♦~P’ would not be well-formed insofar as the 
domain of the agential modal operator ‘♦’ only consists of agential states. Second, we might 
interpret P as an agential state. If so, then ‘□ P’ would not be well-formed insofar as the domain 
of the physical modal operator ‘□’ only consists of physical states. Either way, Rule Alpha is 
invalid because it must rely on an assertion that is not well-formed. Since List believes that the 
agential level is most likely both multiply realized and indeterministic (even if physical 
determinism is true), he insists that there are often multiple possible agential futures (even 
though there may be only one possible physical future). Therefore, he concludes that the 
consequence argument, as advanced by van Inwagen, relies on an invalid inference from a 
physical-level modal proposition to an agential-level modal proposition. 
 With that said, List does consider two valid versions of the consequence argument – one 
physical, the other agential. The problem is that neither is sufficient to make an inference about 
free will. The physical version derives a physical-level modal proposition from the truth of 
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physical determinism. But physical-level modal propositions are not sufficient to determine 
whether or not multiple possibilities are available to an agent. Therefore, this version of the 
consequence argument is irrelevant with respect to free will despite being both valid and sound. 
Alternatively, an agential version is capable of concluding that no agent ever has the possibility 
of doing otherwise. But it must assume the truth of agential determinism, which (according to 
List) is unlikely to be true. Therefore, the agential version can only undermine the existence of 
free will by assuming an implausible premise, rendering it unsound.12 What both of these valid 
arguments have in common (besides being insufficient to undermine free agency) is that they are 
both level-specific. Consequently, we must conclude that level-specific versions of the 
consequence argument are valid but insufficient to undermine free will, while cross-level 
versions are sufficient to undermine free will but invalid. 
 So perhaps the most obvious challenge to List’s view is to reject his level-specific 
conception of modality. He considers two possible strategies – one of which involves making a 
cross-level inference, while the other involves a cross-level modal proposition. In response to the 
first, he points out that any cross-level modal inference must rely on the language of 
supervenience, which is the only sort of cross-level logical relation available within his multi-
level modal theory. But, he argues, the language of supervenience only allows us to assert 
propositions about the relations between states at different levels – supervenience does not allow 
us to assert modal propositions about states at a specific level. And in response to the second 
strategy, he points out that cross-level modal propositions (e.g., the agential state A is physically 
 
12 It is worth noting that List’s concession that agential determinism is sufficient to undermine free will 
may satisfy van Inwagen. If agential determinism is true, then we could construct a valid and sound version of the 
consequence argument. This may be sufficient to capture van Inwagent’s intention – if agential determinism is true, 
then free will is not possible. The question is whether or not physical determinism implies agential determinism. 
24 
 
necessary and the physical state P is agentially necessary) are not well-formed propositions 
insofar as the domain of such modal operators is level-specific. And since the domain of the 
modal operators is level-specific, such cross-level modal propositions are meaningless. 
 But notice that both of these objections are formal. List is only appealing to the rules of 
the system that he has designed. Beyond citing such formal rules, List’s only arguments against 
cross-level modal reasoning are epistemic, as I discussed in the previous section. These 
arguments, however, only cite epistemic limitations and do not place any normative restrictions 
on the type of concepts that we can formalize in a multi-level modal theory. If sufficient 
justification were provided to introduce a new concept into the theory that allowed for cross-
level modal reasoning, then both List’s response to the consequence argument and his theory of 
free will may be undermined. In order to fill the cross-level gap in List’s multi-level modal 
theory, I introduce what I refer to as meta-levels in the next section. 
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4 META-LEVELS 
In this section, I propose an addition to the multi-level modal theory described in the first 
section. Specifically, I introduce the notion of a meta-level.13 The purpose of a meta-level is to 
provide a formal basis for cross-level modal reasoning. Contra List, I see no reason to exclude 
cross-level modal reasoning from the multi-level modal theory. To be blunt, it seems obvious to 
me that scientists frequently make inferences about the modal properties at one level based upon 
the modal properties at another. In a nutshell, we can describe this sort of cross-level modal 
reasoning with the concept of a meta-level. Moreover, as I will argue below, the concept of a 
meta-level helps demonstrate the significance of the argument for the emergence of 
indeterminism. Without assuming at least one of the rules of inference I introduce in this section, 
List and Pivato’s argument for the emergence of indeterminism loses its significance. This 
section is divided into two sub-sections. First, I define meta-levels in more detail and defend 
their inclusion within the multi-level modal theory by introducing the modal properties of a 
meta-level. Second, I revise the consequence argument by describing a meta-level version that is 
both valid and (I think) sufficient to undermine free will. At the end of this section, I hope to 
have convinced the reader that List must be committed to a hypothetical conception of the 
possibility of doing otherwise, and therefore that List’s theory of free will is neither actualist nor 
libertarian. 
 
13 For a thorough discussion of the ‘levels’ metaphor, see Carl Craver (2015). He argues that there are many 
applications of the levels metaphor. The notion of meta-levels is simply another instance of the ‘levels’ metaphor 
that I think is helpful for thinking about the ontological levels described by List. 
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4.1 Meta-level modality 
So what is a meta-level? To start, consider those scientific disciplines that we might think 
of as a specific level of description (such as biology) that seem capable of being broken down 
into multiple distinct levels of scientific description (such as genetics, organic chemistry, and 
neurobiology). What I have in mind is a level that can be broken down into multiple levels –a 
meta-level is some level (such as biology) that consists of multiple levels itself.14 The basic idea 
is that scientists often operate at some meta-level by considering how the modal properties at one 
level determine the modal properties at another level given both sets of level-specific laws and 
the laws of supervenience that connect those levels. An important question, then, is – what sort 
of theoretical virtue do meta-levels add to the multi-level modal theory discussed in the first 
section. I think the justification for thinking about meta-levels comes from the theoretical virtue 
of supervenience claims. It seems to me that the entire point of talking about supervenience is to 
acknowledge scientifically significant ways in which the processes described at one level stand 
in a modal relation to processes at another level. In my view, if we are going to develop a 
sophisticated multi-level modal theory, we must recognize that there are levels within levels – or, 
according to the formal jargon that I am developing, there are base-levels within meta-levels. 
 To demonstrate, consider a biological description of the history of a specific organism. At 
any given time, the state of an organism includes genetic, cellular, physiological, and neural 
arrangements. We could describe the organism solely at the genetic level, or we could describe 
 
14 The term ‘meta-level’ is admittedly vague. I considered referring to meta-levels as ‘levels of abstraction,’ 
where the basic idea is that there is a different hierarchy of ontological levels at different levels of abstraction. So, 
for example, at one level of abstraction there may only be the following levels – physics, chemistry, biology, 
psychology, and so on; while at another level of abstraction, there may be a finer-grained hierarchy of levels – 
particle physics, atomic physics, atomic chemistry, biochemistry, cellular biology, and so on. The primary point is 
that a more coarse-grained system of levels would consist of ‘meta-levels’ (such as biology) that are constituted by 
the conjunction of base-levels (such as biochemistry, molecular biology, cellular biology, and so on).  
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the organism solely at the physiological level.15 But we might want to describe the state of the 
organism at a more general level, which we may choose to refer to as the biological level. Such a 
description will not specify the state of the organism at a single level; rather, the state of the 
organism at the level of biology in general will consist of specifying the state of the organism at 
multiple levels. So when we specify the state of an organism at a specific level at a specific time, 
we assign the organism a single state at that level. But if we are operating at a meta-level, we 
will assign the organism a set of states that includes a single state for each base-level. To be 
clear, a meta-level can simply be understood as a conjunctive-level. Nomenclature aside, the 
basic idea is that scientists often operate at a ‘level’ that is better understood as a conjunction of 
multiple levels.16 
 So for example, we might specify the state of some human being at the physical level by 
assigning it the physical state P, and we might specify the state of that same human at the 
agential level by assigning it the agential state A. But if we are operating at some meta-level that 
includes only the agential and physical levels as base-levels, we would specify the state of the 
human by assigning it the pair of states {P, A}. In general, if we are operating at a meta-level 
that consists of n base-levels, then any specification of a system at that meta-level will be a set of 
 
15 It may be argued that you cannot actually talk about an organism at the genetic level. This, I think, helps 
make my point – if you want to talk about the organism as a whole, you must talk about how certain high-level 
properties of the organism (such as its anatomy) supervene on low-level properties (such as its genetic make-up).  
16 For skeptics of the notion of a meta-level, I must emphasize that I am not claiming that biology is a meta-
level and that genetics is a base-level. What I am suggesting is that there are certain scientific inquiries that must be 
conceptualized as operating at some sort of meta-level in which two or more base-levels are being considered. 
Similar to List, I am not providing a taxonomy of levels; rather, I am only providing a basic framework for thinking 
about levels. A more thorough analysis of the notion of a meta-level could certainly be provided, but this is beyond 
the scope of this paper. For my purposes, the most important point is that scientific inquiry often operates by 
thinking about a system as a whole and the level-specific laws and supervenience mappings that determine the 
structure of that system. 
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n base-level states. To provide a more formal representation of a meta-level, let’s make the 
modal operators described by List more explicit: 
 □ (P) def   =   □tw (P | PLw & ptw) 
This states that, to say that the physical state P is physically necessary is equivalent to saying that 
P is necessary at time t in world w conditionalized upon the physical laws of w (PLw) and the 
physical history of w at time t. This notation simply makes explicit what List packs into his 
modal operators. Given this notation, I provide a formal definition of meta-level necessity: 
 □M (P, A) def   =   □tw (P, A | PLw & ALw & ptw & htw & SLw) 
This states that, to say that the physical and agential ‘P & A’ states are necessary at the meta-
level is equivalent to saying that P and A are necessary at t in w conditionalized upon the 
physical and agential laws of w, the physical and agential histories of w at t, and the laws of 
supervenience connecting each level in w. A corresponding definition can be provided for 
possibility. 
 Since each meta-level is constituted by multiple levels, meta-level modal propositions are 
derived from the laws of each base-level and the laws of supervenience connecting the base-
levels. For example, if we are operating at a meta-level that includes only the physical and 
agential levels as base-levels, then the truncated history of some world w at that meta-level will 
consist of the pair {at, pt} where at is the agential-level history of w and pt is the physical history 
of w. Therefore, modal propositions at this meta-level are determined by the number of pairs {a, 
p} that are nomologically consistent with {at, pt} according to both the agential and physical laws 
of w and the laws of supervenience that connect the agential and physical levels. 
 To demonstrate the utility of the notion of a meta-level, I must introduce some rules of 
modal inference at the meta-level. There is one modal inferences that I think is justified, and one 
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that is not. In general, if a future state is nomologically necessary at the base-level at which it is 
defined, then we can infer that the state is nomologically necessary at the meta-level that 
includes that base-level. So inferring meta-level necessity from the base-level is justified. But, if 
a future state is nomologically possible at the base-level, then we cannot infer that the state is 
nomologically possible at the meta-level. So inferring meta-level possibility or the lack of 
necessity from the base-level is not justified. 
 Let’s start with the inference of necessity. If a state is necessary according to a specific 
law, then that state must be necessary according to that law in conjunction with any other set of 
laws that are consistent with that law. If a state is necessary according to some set of 
nomological information, then there is no additional information that could make that necessary 
state non-necessary. Therefore, necessity is overdetermined by level-specific laws – no amount 
of additional information that will change the modal fact that some state is necessary. But this is 
not true for possibility. A state may be possible according to a specific law even though it is 
impossible according to that same law in conjunction with other laws. This is because possibility 
and the negation of necessity are underdetermined by level-specific laws. A state may be 
possible according to some set of nomological information, even though that same state may be 
necessary according to additional information. 
 Think of this asymmetry between necessity and possibility in epistemic terms. If you 
believe that some state P is possible given your incomplete background knowledge K, while it is 
in fact impossible relative to a complete set of modally relevant information I (i.e., the laws and 
histories at the specific level in question). In this case, it is possible for K to be consistent with I. 
You may not know that P is actually impossible simply because of your epistemic limits. In 
other words, your background knowledge K does not contain all of the information I but that 
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information need not be inconsistent. Something may have been possible relative to an 
incomplete specification of the past or the laws of nature even though it is impossible relative to 
a complete specification of the past and those laws. In contrast, if you believe that P is necessary 
given K, while it is in fact not-necessary relative to I, then you may not consistently believe K is 
true upon learning I. In this case, your belief is mistaken due to your epistemic fallibility. In 
other words, K must be incorrect even if it is incomplete, since K must be inconsistent with I. If 
your theory predicts that something is necessary and it turns out to be non-necessary, then your 
theory must have been false in some way – it could not have been merely incomplete. This 
asymmetry between necessity and possibility should not be surprising insofar as necessity, by 
definition, has a stronger modal force than possibility. 
 With this in mind, I introduce the following rules of modal inference between the meta-
level and its base-levels. For the sake of simplicity, I will consider the meta-level that includes 
only the agential and physical levels as base-levels. Before I introduce the rules, I must introduce 
modal operators that are specific to the meta-level. Henceforth, the modal operators □M and ◊M 
will refer to the nomological necessity and possibility at the meta-level that includes only the 
agential and physical levels as base-levels. Additionally, any reference to the meta-level will be 
in reference to that meta-level that includes only the agential and physical levels. With this, we 
can introduce the following rules: 
 [□ P  ⟝  □M P]    and     ~[□MP   ⟝  □ P] 
 ~ [◊P  ⟝  ◊M P]    and    [◊MP  ⟝  ◊P] 
With these, you can derive: 
 ~ [~□ P  ⟝ ~□M P]    and   [~□MP  ⟝  ~□P] 
 [~◊P  ⟝  ~◊MP]    and     ~[~◊MP   ⟝  ~◊P] 
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Notice the asymmetry between necessity and its negation, and possibility and its negation. If a 
state is necessary at a base-level, then it is necessary at the meta-level – same thing for 
impossibility. But just because it’s necessary at the meta-level does not imply that it is necessary 
at the base-level – again, same thing for impossibility. On the other hand, if a state is possible at 
the base-level, then it may or may not be possible at the meta-level – same thing for the lack of 
necessity. With that said, a state cannot be possible at the meta-level without being possible at 
the state’s base-level – and again, same thing for the lack of necessity. So although there are no 
justifiable rules of inference from base-level possibility (or from the lack of necessity) to the 
meta-level, there are justifiable rules of inference from meta-level possibility (or the lack of 
necessity) to one of the base-levels. 
 To demonstrate, suppose that the world is physically deterministic. According to List and 
Pivato, the truth of physical determinism implies that all physically possible states are physically 
necessary. So, assuming physical determinism and the rules of meta-level modal inference 
defended above, we can infer that there is some future state P that is necessary at the meta-level 
M. We might also assume agential indeterminism, such that there are two states A1 and A2 that 
are both possible and non-necessary at the agential level. But given the above rules of inference, 
this is not sufficient to conclude that A1 and A2 are either possible or not-necessary at the meta-
level. In fact, given the law of supervenience as articulated by List, there is a surjective mapping 
from the physical level onto the agential level. Therefore, there is a single agential state that is 
necessitated (as a matter supervenience) by each physical state. So if P is necessary at the meta-
level and P is the subvenient base of A1 but not A2 (since only one higher-level state will 
supervene on a specific lower-level state), then A1 must be necessary at the meta-level (while A2 
must be impossible). 
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 At this point, I must emphasize that, without assuming the rules of inference introduced 
above, List and Pivato’s argument for emergent indeterminism loses its significance. What 
makes this argument significant is the implicit assumption that there is at least some modal 
relations that must hold between higher and lower levels. Specifically, the argument assumes that 
a higher-level state is possible if and only if its history (at the higher-level) is realized by a 
physical history that is also possible. Remove this constraint and the argument for the 
consistency of higher-level indeterminism and lower-level determinism becomes trivial. The 
simple fact that List and Pivato consider multiple realization to be an essential ingredient in their 
argument demonstrates that they make this implicit assumption. Thus, the notion of a meta-level 
actually provides a foundation for the significance of their argument. In other words, introducing 
meta-levels into the multi-level modal theory does not undermine the argument for emergent 
indeterminism; rather, it makes the significance of that argument clear. To be precise, what’s 
significant about the argument is that agential indeterminism is consistent with physical 
determinism despite the modal relations that must hold between those two levels at the meta-
level.  
 Finally, I want to emphasize another important implication of my argument. A meta-level 
is deterministic if its lowest base-level is deterministic17, while a meta-level is indeterministic if 
(and only if) its lowest base-level is indeterministic.18 This is because the state of the system at 
the meta-level at any given time will be specified by the pair {P, A}. Assuming physical 
 
17 See Appendix A. There, I provide an argument to demonstrate that determinism at the lowest base-level 
entails determinism at the meta-level. 
18 To be precise, it is possible for a meta-level to be deterministic even if all of its base-levels are 
indeterministic, but it is not possible for a meta-level to be indeterministic if it’s lowest base-level is deterministic. 
Demonstrating the compatibility of meta-level determinism given indeterminism at each base-level is a complicated 
proof that is unnecessary for the purposes of this paper. 
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determinism, we can see that there is only one state P that is possible at any given time. And 
since there is only one state A that supervenes on P, there is only one pair {P, A} that is possible 
at the meta-level.  
 Before turning towards the consequence argument, recall List’s two objections against 
cross-level modal reasoning. In the first, he points out that any cross-level modal inference must 
rely on the language of supervenience. But, he argues, the language of supervenience only allows 
us to assert propositions about the relations between states at different levels – supervenience 
does not allow us to assert modal propositions about states at a specific level. And second, cross-
level modal propositions (e.g., the agential state A is physically necessary and the physical state 
P is agentially necessary) are not well-formed propositions. Since the domain of such modal 
operators is level-specific, such cross-level modal propositions are incoherent. However, cross-
level modal inferences made at the meta-level avoid both of these objections. The first objection 
states that the language of supervenience cannot be used to assert modal propositions about 
specific states. But the language of the meta-level is not identical to the language of 
supervenience. Rather, modal propositions at the meta-level are merely conditionalized on the 
laws of supervenience. But meta-level propositions are also conditionalized on multiple sets of 
level-specific laws which makes the meta-level language capable of asserting modal propositions 
about specific states. And since the meta-level has its own modal operators, it can assert modal 
propositions about any of the possible states in its domain. Therefore, List’s second objection, 
which states that level-specific modal operators cannot be used to assert modal propositions 
about states at other levels, does not apply to the meta-level modal operators. By stipulation, the 
domain of a meta-level modal operator includes all of the states in the domain of each of its base-
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levels. So, the modal operators at the meta-level may be used to assert modal propositions about 
both agential and physical states. 
4.2 A meta-level version of the consequence argument 
 Contra List, I argue there is yet another version of the consequence argument that is 
valid, sound, and relevant to free will. This version of the argument operates at the meta-level. 
To start, we must introduce a revised version of Rule Alpha designed to work at the meta-level: 
 Revised Rule Alpha: □ P⟝  ~◊M ~P19 
Notice that this revised version of Rule Alpha simply follows from the first meta-level modal 
inference described in the previous section. Therefore, if my argument for those modal 
inferences is sound, then the revised version of Rule Alpha should be valid. 
 Before introducing my revision of the consequence argument, I want to first point out 
that many of the premises of the initial consequence argument are unnecessary given the modal 
semantics developed by List and Pivato. Since the modal propositions in the multi-level modal 
theory are nomological modal propositions that are determined by a measure over the number of 
possible futures given a specific truncated history and the natural laws, much of the original 
consequence argument is unnecessary within the modal framework developed by List and 
Pivato. Recall from the formal equivalences discussed above, to say that P is necessary is to say 
that P is nomologically necessary according to the laws of physics given the truncated physical 
history of a specific world. Therefore, the proposition ‘□ ((po & L) → P)’ is equivalent to the 
modal proposition ‘□ P’ since the truncated physical history p0 and the physical laws L are 
 
19 To be clear, whether or not ~◊M articulates a truth about what is not possible for agents to do is what is up 
for debate. I am arguing that meta-level modal propositions are capable of saying something about what agents can 
and cannot do. As I discuss below, one of List’s possible recourses against my argument is to argue that meta-level 
modal propositions don’t say anything relevant about agents. 
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presupposed within the modal operator ‘□.’ In other words, the modal operators within the multi-
level modal theory are, by definition, a measure over what is possible relative to the past and the 
laws of the specific level in question.20 
 So the multi-level modal theory actually makes the consequence argument much simpler. 
At the meta-level, we can reconstruct the argument as follows21: 
 Revised Rule Alpha: □ p ⟝  ~◊M ~p  
 Rule Beta: □M (p → a), □M p ⟝  □M a 
1. □ P        Physical Determinism 
2. ~◊M ~P        Revised Rule Alpha 
3. ~◊M ~ (P → A)       Supervenience 
4. ~◊M ~A        Rule Beta 
Notice that the third premise is derived from supervenience. Recall that supervenience entails that 
each lower-level state maps onto a specific higher-level state. So the conditional in the third 
premise is necessary according to the laws of supervenience, and is therefore necessary at the meta-
level since meta-level modal propositions are conditionalized on all of the base-level laws and the 
laws of supervenience. To be precise, it is necessary at the meta-level that each physical state 
 
20 I assume List presents the consequence argument as it was originally formulated by van Inwagen in order 
to maintain consistency between the original argument and his objection (which is also why I have included List’s 
formulation of the argument). But I think he may have been mistaken to do this. Given the modal semantics he and 
Pivato have developed, it’s not clear what it even means to say that the laws of physics are nomologically necessary 
according to the laws of physics. Laws are not states of a system, so I’m not sure they are included within the 
domain of any of the modal operators within the multi-level modal theory. In any case, assuming such modal 
propositions about laws do have meaning, their meaning must be trivial. Similarly, modal propositions about the 
past must also be trivial. According to List and Pivato, the past is simply trivially necessary (in both deterministic 
and indeterministic worlds). The basic point is that the modal proposition ‘□t (Pt & L)’ must be trivial insofar as the 
meaning of ‘□t P’ is ‘P is necessary at t according to the laws of physics (i.e. L) and the truncated physical history up 
to time t (i.e. pt).’ 
21 Notice that Rule Beta has also been revised. This revision is not intended to replace the original Rule 
Beta since I believe they are both derived from the same general rule. The revision of Rule Beta depicted above is 
simply articulated in meta-level jargon. 
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implies a single agential state. So then, applying Rule Beta, we can conclude that any agential state 
that supervenes on a physical state that is necessary at the meta-level must also be necessary. 
Finally, if a state is necessary, then its negation is not possible. So according to the revised 
consequence argument, there is only one possible agential state at the meta-level assuming 
physical determinism. And if there is only one agential possibility, then an agent does not truly 
have the possibility of doing otherwise (if ‘possibility’ is understood to be meta-level possibility 
as I have described it).  
 There are two ways in which List could object to my argument. First, he might object to 
the concept of a meta-level. Although I have not defended this view in this paper, I do not think 
that such an objection would be sound. His framework for a system of levels is already 
questionable due to how rigidly his theory distinguishes between different levels. It seems to me 
that the only way to salvage his framework against such a worry is to introduce the notion of a 
meta-level. Moreover, as I argued above, the modal properties of the meta-level actually provide 
a background against which the argument for the emergence of indeterminism may seem 
significant. 
 Second, he might accept the notion of a meta-level but argue that a modal analysis of free 
will should be restricted to the agential level. I think that this is his best option for responding to 
my argument. This objection, however, must consist of an argument for the irrelevance of 
physics (or other deterministic lower levels) with respect to free will. Currently, he has not 
provided such an argument. And I think there are some reasons to be skeptical of the soundness 
of such an argument. In particular, the effects of our agency seem to be quite diverse. Our actions 
seem to have physical, biochemical, social, and many other sorts of consequences. It seems to 
me that we should want our multi-level modal theory to account for this sort of inter-level 
37 
 
causation. When an agent makes a decision, that decision not only has consequences describable 
at the agential level, there seem to also be consequences that are describable at the physical level. 
For example, consider an agent’s decision to go on vacation. This decision has consequences 
concerning where in space and time the physical constituents of that agent’s body will be. Given 
my understanding of List’s view, it seems plausible to me that he would that the consequences of 
an agent’s actions are only describable at an agential level. But to be quite honest, I’m not sure 
what it means for an agent’s decisions to have agential consequences but not physical 
consequences. I’ll say a bit more about inter- and intra-level causation in the next section. For 
now, I just want to point out that List may be able to avoid my objections by arguing that 
causation is level-specific. Although I am skeptical of this view, I will not consider its merits and 
demerits in this paper. 
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5 A DILEMMA FOR THE COMPATIBILIST-LIBERTARIAN 
The gist of List’s view on free will is to take all of the good from both compatibilism and 
libertarianism without taking any of the bad. If my argument so far has been sound, then 
compatibilist-libertarianism fails to deliver a robustly libertarian (i.e., non-hypothetical) 
conception of possibility of doing otherwise. Instead, despite his intentions, List must rely on a 
hypothetical conception of an agent’s ability to do otherwise. As I stated in the introduction, my 
primary goal in this paper is to convince the reader that List has accomplished the opposite of his 
intended goal. Not only does List’s theory fail to satisfy any libertarian requirements (and is 
therefore just compatibilist), I argue in this section that he has taken all of the bad from both 
theories without taking any of the good. Specifically, I argue that List’s response to what I will 
refer to as the causal source objection against compatibilism fares worse than other (non-
libertarian) varieties of compatibilism when considered in conjunction to what I will refer to as 
the randomness objection to libertarianism. 
5.1 The causal source objection 
 Consider the causal source objection against compatibilism. In a nutshell, the causal 
source objection states that agents cannot be the causal source of their actions in a deterministic 
world. In other words, since all of an agent’s actions are necessitated prior to their birth, an agent 
cannot be the difference that explains why one set of possibilities was actualized as opposed to 
another. Instead of the agent, the initial conditions of the universe seem to be the causal source of 
everything that happens.22 
 
22 An example of such an argument is Derk Pereboom’s argument for source incompatibilism – e.g., see 
Pereboom (2006). A similar argument is the manipulation argument, which attempts to demonstrate that there is no 
difference between a case in which an agent’s behavior is determined by natural laws and a case in which an agent’s 
behavior is determined by some omnipotent agent capable of manipulating an agent’s behavior.   
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 In response to objections of this kind, however, compatibilists have convincingly argued 
that this sort of argument relies on a conception of causal source that is profoundly inadequate. 
Most notably, if causality is understood according to a causal interventionist framework, then an 
agent may be rightfully identified as the causal source of their behavior if intervening on the 
states of that agent (such as their beliefs, desires, motivations, etc.) regularly produces changes in 
that person’s behavior. In other words, for an agent to be the causal source of their action, they 
must be the difference that makes a difference. The problem with the causal source objection is 
that it implies that there are no local causal sources in a deterministic system – all causal sources 
trace back to the totality of the initial conditions. Such a conception of causality seems 
practically useless. In contrast, causal interventionist and difference-making accounts of 
causation tend to isolate some local variable that regularly makes the difference between whether 
or not some future event takes place. List has also defended a difference-making account of 
agential causation with Peter Menzies.23 Citing the likely multiple realization of most agential 
states, they argue that an agential state is more likely to be the difference that makes a difference 
at the agential level than any disjunction of lower-level realizers. How multiple realization makes 
this work is not relevant for my purposes – what’s important is simply that List’s conception of 
agential causation relies on a difference-making account of causation in general. Put simply, an 
agent is the cause of some effect insofar as that agent (or some state of that agent) is the crucial 
difference that explains the occurrence of the effect in question. 
 To be clear, the causal source objection that I described above should not be conflated 
with the causal exclusion argument. The causal source objection need not rely on the distinction 
 
23 Similar responses to what I am characterizing as causal source objections can be found in Deery and 
Nahmias (2017). 
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between physical and agential states, whereas the causal exclusion argument states that agential 
states cannot be understood as the cause insofar as their subvenient base, the physical level, 
supposedly overdetermines all causal relations. I do not wish to comment on the adequacy of the 
causal exclusion argument here. For this reason, I have introduced the causal source as a sort of 
argumentative caricature simply in order to highlight a shortcoming of compatibilist-
libertarianism. But before demonstrating that shortcoming, I must discuss another argumentative 
caricature against the libertarian, which I refer to as the randomness objection. For now, it will 
suffice to say that List and many other compatibilists agree that some sort of difference-making 
account of causation is necessary to make sense of a compatibilist theory of free will. 
5.2 The randomness objection 
Perhaps the most general argumentative caricature posed against libertarianism is the 
randomness objection.24 According to this objection, indeterminism cannot make any difference 
with respect to whether or not agents are free because it simply introduces a degree of 
randomness. Some compatibilists are willing to allow for free will in an indeterministic world, 
but they insist that free will is merely compatible with both determinism and at least some forms 
of indeterminism. There may be some degree of randomness to what we choose to do, but that 
randomness doesn’t make us more free – in fact, randomness may make us less free. However, 
List, along with standard libertarians, cannot appeal to such a position in order to avoid the 
randomness objection. A true libertarian cannot be satisfied with the mere compatibility of free 
will and indeterminism; rather, they must require indeterminism. The fundamental challenge for 
any libertarian theory of free will is to explain why indeterminism is necessary for free will. List, 
 
24 See Widerker and Schnall (2015) for a discussion of the randomness objection. Pereboom (2006) also 
discusses the problem of randomness for the libertarian, although he does not refer to as ‘the randomness objection.’ 
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for example, insists that agential indeterminism must be true in order to provide agents with 
alternative possibilities. But by introducing agential indeterminism, he has simply introduced a 
degree of randomness with respect to which agential possibilities are actualized. 
 And it is here that I hope the reader will begin to see the unraveling of compatibilist-
libertarianism. Recall that List defends agential causation by arguing that agents (or agential 
states) may be understood as the causal source of some change in the world when they are 
(roughly speaking) the difference that makes a difference with respect to that change. This, 
however, is undermined by the truth of physical determinism in conjunction with agential 
indeterminism. Notice that the difference that truly makes a difference between two worlds with 
identical agential histories and distinct agential futures must be their unique physical histories. 
It’s not a matter of whether or not the agential state or the disjunction of physical states is a 
better explanation, because there is simply no agential state that can explain the difference. By 
conjoining agential indeterminism with physical determinism, List seems to have made the 
prospect for a plausible conception of indeterministic agential causation even worse. As long as 
physical determinism is true, the causal source of which of two or more alternative agential 
possibilities is actualized seems to be something in the distinct physical histories that preceded 
the modal splitting at the agential level. 
 One plausible response is that causality is level-specific.25 Given List’s level-specific 
proclivities with respect to modality, it seems plausible that he might also endorse a level-
specific conception of causality. This would allow him to appeal to a probabilistic account of 
 
25 For a defense of the level-specificity of causality, see Craver and Bechtel (2007). They argue that, 
although there may be top-down causation, there are no top-down causes. Top-down causation may only occur by 
being “mechanistically mediated” by lower-level realizers; so, the lower-level realizers would be the cause rather 
than the higher-level states themselves.  
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difference-making in which agential causes need not deterministically necessitated their effect. 
Rather, an agential state may be rightfully identified as the cause of some effect if that state 
makes some probabilistic difference in whether or not the possible effect is actualized. Without a 
level-specific conception of causation, however, any probabilistic differences that could be 
identified at the higher level would make less of a probabilistic difference than their physical 
realizers that deterministically necessitate the possible effect.  
In contrast, if we assume both the physical and agential levels are indeterministic, then 
higher-level states may make more of a probabilistic difference than their physical realizers. To 
demonstrate, consider the following example, which is only designed to demonstrate the logical 
possibility of higher-level difference-making assuming both physical and agential indeterminism. 
We’ll start with four possible physical states {P1, P2, P3, P4, P4} that are all equally probable 
relative to the laws of physics – this would assign each state a probability of 0.2. Further, we’ll 
stipulate that there are two possible agential states {A1, A2} where (we’ll assume) the probability 
of A1 is 0.8 and the probability of A2 is 0.2. This is demonstrated below – where the darker line 
leading to A1 is supposed to indicate that A1 is more probable than A2. 
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Figure 2. Levels 
 
Finally, we’ll assume that A1 is multiply realized by P1 and P2, while A2 is multiply realized by 
P3 and P4.  
  
 
Figure 3. Multiple Realization 
 
Taken in conjunction with one another, we can see that, at the meta-level, the probability of (P1, 
A1) and (P2, A1) is greater than the probability of (P3, A2) and (P4, A2) despite the fact that all 
of the physical states are equally probable when solely conditionalized on physical laws. In this 
case, the agential history makes more of a probabilistic difference than the physical history with 
respect to both P1 and P2. To be clear, I am not arguing that this scenario is necessary if we 
assume both physical and agential indeterminism. Rather, I have only stipulated the parameters 
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of the scenario in order to demonstrate the logical possibility of agential difference-making given 
both physical and agential indeterminism. So if we assume (as List does) that determinism is true 
at the physical level while it is false at the agential level, then the difference-making account of 
agential causation seems to be in trouble unless we assume that causation is level-specific. In 
contrast, if we assume determinism is false at all levels, then we have an account that renders 
agential causation much more plausible. 
In any case, even if causality should be understood as a solely level-specific phenomenon 
and the above argument is rendered meaningless (since it relies on a cross-level conception of 
causation), I think I have at least demonstrated that List’s compatibilist-libertarian theory of free 
will must provide more answers to some theoretical questions concerning the relationship 
between agential indeterminism and agential causation. If I am right, List may need to abandon 
his attempt to reconcile free will with determinism at the physical level. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
Assuming something like my meta-level revision of the multi-level modal theory is sound, 
List’s theory of free will seems to be neither libertarian nor actualist. At best, he can avoid the 
causal source objection by employing a level-specific conception of causality. At worst, his 
theory renders agential causation incoherent according to a difference-making account of 
causation. In any case, if I have at least backed List into a corner in which he must insist on a 
level-specific conception of causality, then I have believe I have accomplished my primary goal, 
which is to place a heavier burden of proof upon List’s shoulders. Furthermore, I’m in agreement 
with Elzein and Pernu that List should provide a more substantial argument for restricting the 
analysis of free will to the agential level. As I suggested earlier, he may accomplish this by either 
rejecting the notion of a meta-level or by insisting that only the agential level alone is capable of 
articulating modal propositions that are relevant to free will. I have attempted to argue that the 
former move would undermine the significance of the argument for the emergence of higher-
level indeterminism, while the latter move seems to conflict with the seemingly plausible claim 
that our actions have non-agential causes. Finally, I have speculated that, if we assume both 
physical and agential indeterminism, we may be able to generate an account of agential causation 
that avoids the causal source objection. 
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APPENDICES  
Appendix A. Lower-level determinism entails meta-level determinism 
 Below is a formal argument to demonstrate that lower-level determinism entails meta-
level determinism. All of the modal operators are assumed to be relative to the same point in 
time t, and in the same world w. For the sake of simplicity, I will only consider two physical 
histories and two agential histories. But if I am right, this argument would be valid for any 
number of physical and agential histories. The primary point is that, if a physical history is 
necessary at the physical level (as a consequence of assuming physical determinism), then the 
agential history that supervenes on that physical history is also necessary at the meta-level.26 Two 
agential histories are assumed only for the purpose of assuming agential indeterminism, which 
requires at least two histories that are both possible and mutually exclusive. 
1. □p1 
 This premise assumes that the world in question is physically deterministic. 
There is a physical history of this world that is necessary at time t. 
 It is important to recognize that this premise entails the following: □~(~p1). 
Since histories are complete descriptions of a possible world, any physical 
history pn ≠ p1 is impossible.    
2. (♦a1 & ~■a1) & (♦a2 & ~■a2) & (a1 ≠ a2) 
 
26 It may be important to remind the reader that ‘histories’ are technical terms within List’s theory. 
Histories are complete specifications of an entire world from the beginning of that world to the end of that world. So 
if we are talking about the modal properties of a history at a specific time within that world, then it makes sense to 
talk about the possibility (or impossibility) of histories. 
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 This premise assumes that the world in question is agentially indeterministic. 
There are two distinct agential histories that are possible, which implies that 
neither is necessary. 
 It is important to recognize that the following argument will work for any 
number of possible agential histories. I am only considering two for the sake 
of simplicity. 
3. (□M p1 → □M a1) & (□M p2 → □Ma2) 
 This premise assumes that a1 supervenes on p1, and that a2 supervenes on p2.  
 It is important to recognize that this assumption is consistent with multiple 
realization. One could stipulate that there are some other physical histories 
that multiply realize either a1 or a2. Regardless of how many physical histories 
are stipulated, the fact remains that only one of those histories (namely, p1) is 
possible (see 1b).  
4. □M p1  
 This premise is derived from premise 1 according to the first meta-level rule 
of inference, which states that base-level necessity is sufficient to infer meta-
level necessity. 
5. Therefore, □M a1 
 The conclusion is derived from premises 4 and 5.  
This argument demonstrates that, even if there are multiple possible higher-level futures at the 
higher-level, there is only one possible higher-level future (assuming lower-level determinism) at 
the meta-level. 
 
